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1978] NINTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
CLASS ACTIONS-DUE PROCESS AND NOTICE IN A
RULE 23(b)(2) CLASS ACTION
I. INTRODUCTION
The Ninth Circuit has recently expressed its view on the requirement
of notice in class actions maintained under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. I In two 1977 decisions, the circuit held that due process
does not require notice to the absent members of a class certified under
subsection 23(b)(2).2 These decisions raise serious constitutional ques-
tions in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co.3 that due process requires notice in all
representative actions. 4
Rule 23 governs the maintenance of class actions in the federal court
system. It is necessary to meet the requirements of both 23(a)5 and 23(b)6
I. FED. R. Civ. P. 23. For text of rule see notes 5-6, 14-15 infra.
2. Elliott v. Weinberger, 564 F.2d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 1977); Souza v. Scalone, 563 F.2d
385, 386 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
3. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
4. Id. at 314. The notice must be reasonably calculated to reach the individual class
members involved, but it need not actually reach the class members to satisfy due process
requirements. Id. at 314-15. See also text accompanying notes 59-95 infra.
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) provides:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on
behalf of all only if (I) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of
the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.
6. Id. 23(b) provides:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a)
are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as
a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to
the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corre-
sponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudica-
tion of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest
of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
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to qualify for class action treatment under the rule. Once these require-
ments have been fulfilled, any judgment in the action will bind all
members of the class with the same force and effect as if every class
member had been before the court. 7 It is this broad res judicata effect that
is the very purpose underlying the rule.8
Section 23(b) sets forth three alternative types of class actions which
may be maintained. 9 One type is embodied in 23(b)(2) which permits
class action treatment where "the party opposing the class has acted or
refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class," and where
the class seeks predominantly injunctive or declaratory relief. 10 Monetary
relief is permissible under this subsection so long as the declaratory or
injunctive relief is predominant.1'
An alternative to 23(b)(2) is found in the much broader provisions of
23(b)(3).12 Subsection 23(b)(3) provides for use of the class action device
where common questions of law or fact predominate, and where the trial
court finds class action posture to be a superior means of disposition of
the suit. "
Notice to members of a class, apprising them of the action, is governed
by 23(d)(2) 4 and 23(c)(2).' 5 Subsection 23(d)(2) is a discretionary provi-
separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controver-
sy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the class in the particular forum; (D)
the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
7. Id. 23(c)(3). Cf. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45-46 (1940) (Court refused to bind
member of class where representation in first suit was found to be inadequate).
8. American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 547 (1974); Dam, Class Action
Notice: Who Needs It?, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 97, 116 [hereinafter referred to as Dam].
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b); see note 6 supra.
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
11. Id. 23, Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966).
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
13. Id.
14. Id. 23(d)(2) provides:
In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate
orders:. . . requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for
the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court may
direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed
extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they
consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or
defenses, or otherwise come into the action.
15. Id. 23(c)(2) provides:
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to the
members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including
individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The
notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him from the class if
he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will
include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not
request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
[Vol. I11
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sion giving the court the power to order notice to the members of any
23(b) class. 16 Notice to members of a (b)(3) class, however, is mandatory
under subsection 23(c)(2), which requires the court to direct to the
members of the class "the best notice practicable under the circum-
stances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort. '17 Subsection 23(c)(2) is, by its own terms,
only applicable to actions maintained under 23(b)(3), leaving any notice
to (b)(2) class members within the discretion of the trial court under
23(d)(2). 11
The fact that the mandatory notice provision of rule 23 does not apply
to actions brought under (b)(2) does not close the question of whether
notice is required in such actions.19 Quite apart from what the rule
requires, the due process clause of the fifth amendment 20 may impose
constitutional requirements for notice. 2' Thus, it is necessary to examine
the possible conflict between the Ninth Circuit view and the due process
clause 22 in light of the constitutional sufficiency of alternative forms of
notice.23
II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT VIEW
The Ninth Circuit has stated its view on the requirement of notice in
23(b)(2) class actions in two recent decisions: Elliott v. Weinberger
24
and Souza v. Scalone.25 Elliott v. Weinberger was an appeal from a
district court order requiring the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare to provide a hearing and notice prior to the initiation of proceed-
ings to recoup overpayments to old-age and disabled social security
16. See note 14 supra.
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). See note 15 supra.
18. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 n.14 (1974).
19. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 564-65 (2d Cir. 1968); text accom-
panying note 55 infra. For a discussion of the rather complex procedural history of Eisen,
see Comment, Class Actions Under Rule 23(b)(2): A Type of Class Action Which Does
Not Require Eisen Notice, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 504, 510-I1 n.26 (1975).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
21. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 564 (2d Cir. 1968).
22. See text accompanying notes 59-95 infra.
23. See text accompanying notes 96-113 infra.
24. 564 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'g Elliott v. Weinberger, 371 F..Supp. 960 (D.
Hawaii 1974) and Buffington v. Weinberger, No. 734-73C2 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 22, 1974).
Elliott and Buffington were consolidated for appeal. Both cases were concerned with the
constitutionality of the recoupment procedure, but since the Elliott district court had
ordered notice pursuant to its discretionary power under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2), only the
Buffington facts gave rise to the issue of notice to absent (b)(2) class members. 564 F.2d at
1228.
25. 563 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
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beneficiaries. 26 The suit was certified as a cldss action under 23(b)(2) on
behalf of the beneficiaries, and the parties sought injunctive relief as well
as damages in the amount of the recouped overpayments.
27
The Secretary in Elliott had challenged the validity of the class action
order, arguing that notice had not been afforded the members of the
beneficiary class. He contended that the failure to provide notice was a
violation of due process of law, and that this failure reduced the effect of
the judgment so as to bind only those individuals named as plaintiffs. The
Ninth Circuit found that
[a]lthough plaintiffs sought recovery of monies recouped from their
monthly benefit checks, their primary purpose in bringing this action
is to enjoin the Secretary from recouping such sums without provid-
ing social security beneficiaries a preceding hearing. In short,
pecuniary recovery is purely incidental to this suit's principal pur-
pose, and consequently this action is properly certifiable under
23(b)(2).
28
The Elliott court held that "due process does not require notice in
every (b)(2) class action,' '29 and that based on the trial court's determina-
tion that the class representation was adequate, "the class members...
[had] received their functional equivalent to a day in court." 3 The
absentees' claims in Elliott were potentially substantial in amount. For
example, a Mrs. Biner, one of the participating class members, was
assessed an overpayment in the amount of $2,216.20 for allegedly
earning income in excess of her 11,680.00 limit in the year 1972.31 Her
benefits were then adjusted so that $50.00 per month would be withheld
from her regular benefit payments.
The active class members who sought recovery in damages of the
assessed over payments were denied monetary relief, and the Elliott
court acknowledged that its determination "forecloses absent members
from bringing individual suits thereafter.'"32 The rule prescribed by the
26. 564 F.2d at 1222.
27. Id. at 1228.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1229 (footnote omitted).
31. Id. at 1225 & n.7.
32. Id. at 1229 n.14. Of course, no court can make a final determination as to the res
judicata effect of its judgment. See, e.g., Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F.
Supp. 619, 636 (D. Kan. 1968), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 441 F.2d
704 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 951 (1972). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 23,
Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 106 (1966). The effect of a judgment is to be
determined in a subsequent action. Zeilstra v. Tarr, 466 F.2d 111, 113 (6th Cir. 1972). The
language of Elliott is illustrative of the Ninth Circuit's intent to consider the action res
judicata as to absentees.
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Ninth Circuit thus authorizes a procedure whereby an individual may be
deprived of a claim for substantial monetary relief without ever being
apprised of the existence of the action so long as the trial court deter-
mines that the class is adequately represented.
In Souza v. Scalone, the plaintiff had filed a class action to contest
the requirements of the Teamsters' Pension Plan, alleging that the Plan's
age-at-break-in-service requirement was arbitrary and unreasonable. 
34
The plaintiff sought an injunction preventing the imposition of the age
requirement, a judgment declaring that the Plan, as administered, was
not for the exclusive benefit of the employees, and damages in the
amount of those retirement benefits denied due to the age requirement.
The court certified the class action as one properly maintainable under
23(b)(2), holding that despite the substantial nature of the damage
claims, "[w]here the monetary relief sought is integrally related to and
would directly flow from the injunctive or declaratory relief sought,
23(b)(2) status is appropriate.' '36 The court further held that since the
action was properly brought under 23(b)(2), neither the rule nor due
process would require notice to absent class members where the repre-
sentation of the class was deemed to be adequate.37
III. DUE PROCESS AND NOTICE
A. The Views Among the Circuits
1. That Due Process Never Requires Notice
Many circuits take the position that a class member's right to due
process never requires notice in a 23(b)(2) class action.3 8 In Childs v.
33. 563 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
34. Id. at 385-86.
35. 64 F.R.D. 654, 658 (N.D. Cal. 1974), vacated and remanded, 563 F.2d 385 (9th Cir.
1977). The Ninth Circuit's discussion of the facts of Souza is very brief; therefore, it may
be necessary to cite to the lower court opinion.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 659-60.
38. Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Katz v.
Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 756 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974);
Hammond v. Powell, 462 F.2d 1053, 1055 (4th Cir. 1972); Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362,
1366 (1st Cir. 1972); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th
Cir. 1969); Lund v. Affleck, 388 F. Supp. 137, 140 (D.R.I. 1975); White v. Local 207,
Laborers' Int'l Union, 387 F. Supp. 53, 54 (W.D. La. 1974); American Fin. Sys., Inc. v.
Harlow, 65 F.R.D. 94, 110-I1 (D. Md. 1974); Citizens Environmental Council v. Volpe,
364 F. Supp. 286, 288 (D. Kan.), aff'd on other grounds, 484 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 355 F. Supp. 1034, 1035 n. 1
(D. Md.), remanded on other grounds, 468 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
910 (1973); Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Ref. Corp., 350 F. Supp. 139, 141 (S.D. Ga. 1972),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded on other grounds, 495 F.2d 437 (5th Cir.), cert.
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United States Board of Parole,39 for example, the defendant Board
objected to the district court's failure to require notice to all class
members when the class was certified. The District of Columbia Circuit
rejected the Board's challenge to the class certification, finding that the
requirements of 23(b)(2) had been met. The court stated, "In this
situation, the notice provision of Rule 23(c)(2) does not apply. "40 With
this limited analysis, the court held that notice is not required in 23(b)(2)
actions.
At least one court, sharing the view expressed in Childs, has suggested
that the presence of an opportunity to exclude oneself from the (b)(3)
class, and the absence of such an opportunity in (b)(2) actions, justifies
the lack of any notice requirement in 23(b)(2) actions. 41 The notion is that
absent an opportunity to "opt-out," there is no action to be taken by the
absentee, and therefore there is no purpose to be served by providing
notice. Most courts adopting this position simply treat the rule as pre-
sumptively valid, thus leaving notice in (b)(2) actions within the sole
discretion of the court under 23(d)(2).42
2. That Due Process May Require Notice
Another view among the circuits is that due process may require notice
in 23(b)(2) actions, but that notice in such actions is not always constitu-
tionally required. 43 The justification which is usually advanced for this
denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974); Baham v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 55 F.R.D. 478,481
(W.D. La. 1972); Wilczynski v. Harder, 323 F. Supp. 509, 512 n.3 (D. Conn. 1971);
Mungin v. Florida E. Coast Ry. Co., 318 F. Supp. 720,732 (M.D. Fla. 1970), aff'don other
grounds, 441 F.2d 728 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 987 (1971); Johnson v. City of
Baton Rouge, 50 F.R.D. 295, 301 (E.D. La. 1970); Solman v. Shapiro, 300 F. Supp. 409,
411-12 n.I (D. Conn.), aff'd on other grounds, 396 U.S. 5 (1969); Northern Natural Gas
Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619, 636 (D. Kan. 1968), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on
other grounds, 441 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 951 (1972).
39. 511 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
40. Id. at 1276.
41. Mungin v. Florida E. Coast Ry. Co., 318 F. Supp. 720, 732 (M.D. Fla. 1970), aff'd
on other grounds, 441 F.2d 728 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 987 (1971).
42. E.g., Childs.v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d at 1276.
43. Elliott v. Weinberger, 564 F.2d 1219, 1228-29 (9th Cir. 1977); Souza v. Scalone, 563
F.2d 385, 386 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); Larionoff v. United States, 533 F.2d 1167, 1184-
86 (D.C. Cir. 1976), aff'd on other grounds, 97 S. Ct. 2150 (1977); Ives v. W.T. Grant Co.,
522 F.2d 749, 764-65 (2d Cir. 1975); Mattern v. Weinberger, 519 F.2d 150, 157-58 (3d Cir.
1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 425 U.S. 987 (1976); United States v.
Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 878-79 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 944 (1976); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 257 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1011 (1975); Lewis v. Philip Morris, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 345,352 (E.D. Va. 1976);
Redhail v. Zablocki, 418 F. Supp. 1061, 1066-68 (E.D. Wis. 1976), aff'd on othergrounds,
98 S. Ct. 673 (1978); Sweet v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 74 F.R.D. 333, 336-37 (N.D.
Ohio 1976); Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945, 960 (W.D. Mich. 1974),
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position is that "[t]he touchstone of due process is that each party has his
or her positions fairly and adequately represented in court. . . .As long
as there is adequate representation, notice is not required in 23(b)(2)
actions." '  The absence of an "opt-out" provision in (b)(2) actions
provides further justification. "In Rule 23(b)(2) action[s] notice would
serve no purpose at this time, as class members cannot opt out as they can
in 23(b)(3) actions."
45
Some of the courts which subscribe to this view suggest particular
circumstances under which notice would be required, 46 but most courts
avoid specific enumeration of such circumstances, merely acknowledg-
ing that they may exist.47 The Ninth Circuit decisions in Elliott and
Souza are representative of this view.
4 8
3. That Due Process Always Requires Notice
The third view on the issue of notice in 23(b)(2) actions is that due
process always requires some form of notice in any representative suit. 49
rev'd mem., 516 F.2d 902 (6th Cir. 1975); Fertig v. Blue Cross of Iowa, 68 F.R.D. 53, 59
(N.D. Iowa 1974); Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 720, 722 n.3 (D. Conn.
1973); Woodward v. Rogers, 344 F. Supp. 974, 980 n.10 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd mem., 486
F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Francis v. Davidson, 340 F. Supp. 351, 361 (D. Md.), aff'd
mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972); King v. Kansas City S. Indus., Inc., 56 F.R.D. 96, 100 (N.D.
Ill. 1972), appeal dismissed per curiam, 479 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1973), aff'd on other
grounds, 519 F.2d 20 (7th Cir. 1975). See also 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.55, at
1152-53 (2d ed. 1977).
44. Sweet v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 74 F.R.D. 333, 336-37 (N.D. Ohio 1976)
(footnotes omitted).
45. Id. at 337 n.11.
46. E.g., Elliott v. Weinberger, 564 F.2d at 1229:
Only when necessary to provide class members an opportunity to signify whether
representation by named plaintiffs is fair and adequate or to intervene to present
additional claims or to otherwise come into the action to, for example, submit views
as amici curiae, does due process require the direction of some sort of notice to
absent members of a (b)(2) class.
The Elliott court found that it was not necessary "to provide class members an opportu-
nity to signify whether representation .. .[was] fair and adequate" because the trial
court record reflected that plaintiffs were represented by "skilled and experienced
counsel." Id.
47. E.g., Sweet v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 74 F.R.D. 333, 336-37 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
48. See text accompanying notes 59-95 infra.
49. Schrader v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 76, 470 F.2d 73, 75 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1085 (1972); Zeilstra v. Tarr, 466 F.2d 111, 113 (6th Cir. 1972); Sandler v.
Tarr, 463 F.2d 1096, 1096 (4th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972); Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 564-65 (2d Cir. 1968); Richmond Black Police
Officers Ass'n v. City of Richmond, 386 F. Supp. 151, 158 (E.D. Va. 1974); Alexander v.
Avco Corp., 380 F. Supp. 1282, 1286 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); Brandt v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.,
62 F.R.D. 160, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Kristiansen v. John Mullins & Sons, Inc., 59 F.R.D.
99, 109 n. 13 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); United States ex rel. Walker v. Mancusi, 338 F. Supp. 311,
316 n.4 (W.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd on other grounds, 467 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1972); Lopez v.
Wyman, 329 F. Supp. 483, 486 (W.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd mem., 404 U.S. 1055 (1972):
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In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,50 for example, the plaintiff had in-
stituted a class action seeking damages and injunctive relief on behalf of
himself and all other purchasers and sellers of "odd-lots" on the New
York Stock Exchange. He alleged that the defendant brokerage firms and
the defendant stock exchange had violated the antitrust and securities
laws respectively. 5' The class was determined to have over six million
members, over two million of whom were ascertainable.52
Faced with the prohibitive cost of notifying over two million class
members individually, 53 Eisen vigorously argued that the action was
properly maintainable under 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2), and that if so main-
tained, individual notice was not required. 4 The court responded:
We must also note that plaintiff's effort to qualify the action under
23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) was induced by his erroneous theory that notice
is not "mandatory" under these sections. This theory is based on
the assumption that 23(c)(2) provides the only "mandatory" notice
required by the new rule. . . . Nevertheless, we hold that notice is
required as a matter of due process in all representative actions, and
23(c)(2) merely requires a particularized form of notice in 23(b)(3)
actions .55
The court cited Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.56 as
requiring this result, 57 and, as will be seen, 8 the Eisen view is probably
the only view among the circuits that does comport with the Mullane
decision.
Zachary v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 52 F.R.D. 532, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); McCarthy v.
Director of Selective Serv. Sys., 322 F. Supp. 1032, 1034 (E.D. Wis. 1970), aff'd per
curiam on other grounds, 460 F.2d 1089 (7th Cir. 1972); Cancel v. Wyman, 321 F. Supp.
528, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), appeal dismissed, 441 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1971); Pasquier v. Tarr,
318 F. Supp. 1350, 1353 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'dpercuriam on other grounds, 444 F.2d 116
(5th Cir. 1971); Fowles v. American Export Lines, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 1293, 1295 n.l
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'dper curiam on other grounds, 449 F.2d 1269 (2d Cir. 1971); Clark v.
American Marine Corp., 297 F. Supp. 1305, 1306 (E.D. La. 1969); Shulman v. Ritzenberg,
47 F.R.D. 202, 205-06 n.10 (D.D.C. 1969).
50. 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968). The Second Circuit may no longer follow Eisen. See
Ives v. W.T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749, 764-65 (2d Cir. 1975); Frost v. Weinberger, 515 F.2d
57, 65 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976). Therefore, Eisen is used merely to
illustrate this third view on the notice requirement.
51. 391 F.2d at 559.
52. Dam, supra note 8, at 101-02.
53. The cost of notifying 2,250,000 known class members individually would have been
approximately $225,000. Id.
54. 391 F.2d at 564.
55. Id. at 564-65 (footnotes omitted).
56. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
57. 391 F.2d at 565.
58. See text accompanying notes 59-95 infra.
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B. The Supreme Court's Rule: Mullane
In 1950, the Supreme Court set forth the requirements of due process
regarding notice in representative actions in Mullane v. CentralHanover
Bank & Trust Co. s9 Mullane was an action to establish the interests of
beneficiaries in a common trust fund. 0 The petition was filed pursuant to
a New York statute61 which authorized notice by publication as a satisfac-
tory means of informing the beneficiaries of the action. The purpose of
the action was twofold: to determine the interests of the beneficiaries,62
and, due to the res judicata effect of the determination, to protect the
trustee from later claims of mismanagement of the trust.63 The Court held
that the New York statute violated the due process rights of the absent
beneficiaries, 64 and set forth the standard for notice: " 'The fundamental
requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.' This right
to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the
matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or
default, acquiesce or contest.' '6 The Court construed the due process
clause as requiring some form of notice whenever "the proceeding is one
in which [absentees] may be deprived of property rights,''66 and the
Court held that, in this particular case, notice by publication alone was
insufficient.67
In Mullane, the Court recognized two property interests that were
subject to potential deprivation, and therefore subject to the due process
notice requirement. One such interest was the potential diminution of the
corpus of the trust by the allowance of fees and expenses to contesting
59. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
60. Id. at 309.
61. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 100-c(12) (McKinney 1944) (amended), as quoted by the
Mullane Court:
After filing such petition [for judicial settlement of its account] the petitioner shall
cause to be issued by the court in which the petition is filed and shall publish not less
than once in each week for four successive weeks in a newspaper to be designated by
the court a notice or citation addressed generally without naming them to all parties
interested in such common trust fund and in such estates, trusts or funds mentioned in
the petition, all of which may be described in the notice or citiation only in the manner
set forth in said petition and without setting forth the residence of any such decedent
or donor of any such estate, trust or fund.
339 U.S. at 309-10.
62. Id. at 309.
63. Id. at 311.
64. Id. at 320.
65. Id. at 314 (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)).
66. 399 U.S. at 313.
67. Id. at 320.
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parties. The other interest threatened was the right of each beneficiary to
bring a subsequent action against the trustee for negligent impairment of
the trust account. 68 The Souza class members faced potential deprivation
of interests similar to the diminution of the trust account in Mullane,6
9
and absentee class members in both Elliott and Souza were deprived of
their interests in bringing subsequent actions.7" These interests are clearly
types which the Mullane holding seeks to protect by requiring notice to
absentees.
Neither the Elliott court nor the Souza court attempts to deal expressly
with the terms of Mullane. Both courts do, however, address the ques-
tion of due process as it relates to notice. 71 The Ninth Circuit has taken
the position that no right to "opt-out" exists in an action of the (b)(2)
type.72 The rule expressly provides (b)(3) class members the opportunity
to exclude themselves from the action; it does not, however, provide that
opportunity to members of a (b)(2) class.7 3 The absence of any right to
68. Id. at 313. The Supreme Court observed:
In two ways this proceeding does or may deprive beneficiaries of property. It may cut
off their rights to have the trustee answer for negligent or illegal impairments of their
interests. Also, their interests are presumably subject to diminution in the proceeding
by allowance of fees and expenses to one who, in their names but without their
knowledge, may conduct a fruitless or uncompensatory contest.
69. In Mullane, class members had invested in a common fund. The Court in that case
was concerned that absentees might be deprived of their property interests in the fund
without notice and an opportunity to be heard. 339 U.S. at 307-09, 313. Similarly, in Souza
v. Scalone, 563 F.2d at 386, absentee class members had invested in a pension fund in
which the class members faced potential deprivation of their interests.
70. Mullane was concerned with an absentee having his or her right to sue "cut off."
This right was also threatened in Elliott and Souza. In Elliott, 564 F.2d at 1228, it was
determined that class members were not entitled to damages in the amount of the
recouped overpayments. Under the doctrine of res judicata, the absentees had their right
to bring an independent action extinguished by the finality of the Elliott judgment.
Similarly, the claims of absentees may have been cut off by the res judicata effect of the
Souza judgment. 563 F.2d at 386. For a discussion of whether the type of relief sought
should affect the notice requirement, see note 83 infra.
Although the Ninth Circuit in Elliott and Souza claimed that res judicata would prevent
absentee class members from pursuing subsequent independent actions on their claims, no
court can decide the final effect to be given to its judgment in a subsequent action. See
note 32 supra.
71. Elliott v. Weinberger, 564 F.2d at 1228-29; Souza v. Scalone, 563 F.2d at 386.
72. Elliott v. Weinberger, 564 F.2d at 1229 n. 14. But cf. Bauman v. United States Dist.
Court, 557 F.2d 650, 659-60 (9th Cir. 1977) (court refused to issue writ of mandamus
directing district court to delete from class order provision permitting members of 23(b)(2)
class to "opt-out" based on fact that class order was not "clearly erroneous," noting that
"Cn]either the Supreme Court nor our court has yet decided whether members of a Rule
23(b)(2) class may exclude themselves from the class.").
For the view that a right to "opt-out" does exist in a 23(b)(2) action, see Walker v.
Styrex Indus., 21 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 355, 358 (M.D.N.C. 1976); Ostapowicz v. Johnson
Bronze Co., 54 F.R.D. 465, 466 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
73. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2); see note 15 supra.
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withdraw from the action is viewed as negating, in part, the purpose to be
served by requiring notice to absentees.74 In Mullane, however, there
was no right in the beneficiaries to exclude themselves from the effect of
the judgment;75 therefore, the "opt-out" rationale for the absence of a
notice requirement may fail to satisfy the due process requirement of
Mullane.
Another justification advanced by the Ninth Circuit for the absence of
a notice requirement is that
it is less likely that there will be special defenses or issues relating to
individual members of a. . .Rule 23(b)(2) class, than in the case of
a Rule 23(b)(3) class. This means there is less reason to be concerned
about each member of the class having an opportunity to be pre-
sent.76
This rationale is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, Mullane recog-
nizes a right in class members to participate in the action, to some
degree, if they so desire. 77 It is this right that Mullane seeks to ensure by
requiring notice. 78 The similarity of each member's claim has no bearing
on whether the absentees should be notified of the action to enable them
to exercise that right. Secondly, the Mullane Court viewed the class of
beneficiaries as being extremely cohesive. "The individual interest does
not stand alone but is identical with that of a class. The rights of each in
the integrity of the fund and the fidelity of the trustee are shared by many
other beneficiaries." ,79 Furthermore, it is questionable whether the (b)(2)
class is necessarily cohesive at all. Rejecting cohesiveness as a basis for
74. Elliott v. Weinberger, 564 F.2d at 1229 n.14; Souza v. Scalone, 563 F.2d at 386
(expressly adopting reasoning of Elliott, and vacating and remanding order "to allow the
district court. . . to consider the contentions of Scalone in light of the general criteria set
out in Elliott.").
75. 339 U.S. at 309, 311. The Court explained, "The decree in each such judicial
settlement of accounts is made binding and conclusive as to any matter set forth in the
account upon everyone having any interest in the common fund or in any particular estate,
trust or fund." Id. at 309. The Court continued,
We understand that every right which beneficiaries would otherwise have against the
trust company, either as trustee of the common fund or as trustee of any individual
trust, for improper management of the common trust fund during the period covered
by the accounting is sealed and wholly terminated by the decree.
Id. at 311.
76. 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1786, at 143
(1972), quoted in Elliott v. Weinberger, Nos. 74-1611, 74-3118, slip op. at 13 (9th Cir. Oct.
1, 1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 425 U.S. 987 (1976). But cf. Elliott v.
Weinberger, 564 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1977) (reference to cohesiveness of (b)(2) class as
basis for court's decision not included in 1977 opinion).
77. See notes 90-94 infra and accompanying text.
78. Id.
79. 339 U.S. at 319.
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eschewing a (b)(2) notice requirement, one court stated, "most racial
and/or sexual discrimination cases simply do not fit this stereotype. They
are large and often encompass a varied set of subclasses. . .. ,,8 Add
to this the liberal standard of the Ninth Circuit for permitting unique
81
damage claims to be joined with claims for injunctive relief,82 and the
(b)(2) class gains the potential of being very diverse.
83
The Elliott and Souza opinions stated that adequacy of representation
is the touchstone of due process, and that if the court determined that
representation of the class was adequate, the need for notice would cease
to exist.84 There are two problems with this justification. In the first
80. Lewis v. Philip Morris, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 345, 352 (E.D. Va. 1976). See also Dam,
supra note 8, at 115-16.
81. Consider the diverse nature of the potential claims of the Elliott absentees. Each
member had been assessed an overpayment on the basis of his or her particular situation.
For example, Mrs. Biner's overpayment assessment was due to her allegedly earning
income in excess of the statutory limit for 1972. 564 F.2d at 1224-25.
82. See text accompanying notes 31-32, 35-36 supra.
83. Some courts have implied that the nature of the relief sought should determine
whether or not due process would require notice in a (b)(2) class action. E.g., Ives v. W.T.
Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749, 765 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding notice not required in (b)(2) action
where relief sought is purely injunctive, but suggesting that inclusion of money damages in
prayer may give rise to due process requirement of notice). This distinction fails for two
reasons. First, the "property right" to file a claim which was recognized in Mullane is not
limited to claims for monetary relief, but rather it is phrased in very broad terms. 339 U.S.
at 313. Secondly, there is no rational justification for affording more protection to
monetary claims than to constitutional or civil rights claims; the latter are certainly no less
significant.
Note also that when Elliott was appealed to the Ninth Circuit for the first time, the
court suggested that the presence of claims for monetary relief might have given rise to a
due process requirement of notice. "When as here, absent members' interests are ade-
quately assured of being represented because there are no money damages involved, ...
notice to the class serves no apparent purpose." Nos. 74-1611, 74-3118, slip op. at 14
(W.D. Wash. Oct. 1, 1975), vacated and remanded on othergrounds, 425 U.S. 987 (1976).
This is curious due to the fact that earlier in the opinion the court discusses the money
damages involved. "Although plaintiffs seek recovery of monies recouped from their
monthly benefit checks, their primary purpose in bringing this action is to enjoin the
Secretary from recouping sums without providing social security beneficiaries a preceding
hearing." Id. at 10. The court's reference to money damages as a justification for the
absence of a notice requirement does not appear in the opinion of Elliott's subsequent
Ninth Circuit appeal.
If such a distinction should be made, it should not be based on the presence of money
damages in the prayer, but on the possibility that such claims exist among absentees. It is
these claims that notice serves to protect; claims that have been joined are being litigated,
and therefore need no such protection. Furthermore, if the focus were not on the potential
claims of absentees, a notice requirement in (b)(2) actions could be avoided by the class
representatives simply forgoing their monetary claims.
84. Elliott v. Weinberger, 564 F.2d at 1229; Souza v. Scalone, 563 F.2d at 386.
Some courts which have held that due process only requires adequate representation
have based their positions on Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). E.g., Larionoff v.
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instance, although Mullane does express concern for the adequacy of
representation, the Court did not treat adequate representation as an
alternative to the notice requirement.85 On the contrary, the Mullane
Court required notice for the purpose of ensuring adequate representa-
tion, observing that "notice reasonably certain to reach most of those
interested in objecting is likely to safeguard the interests of all, since any
objection sustained would inure to the benefit of all. '"86 The Court
recognized that although the representation by some beneficiaries may
very well serve to protect the interests of absentees, that alone would not
satisfy the requirements of due process.8 7 Another court,88 relying on
Mullane, rejected the argument that where representation is adequate,
notice is not constitutionally required, reasoning that the "argument
assumes that the district judge can foresee all the potential claims that
may be raised by class members in contesting the adequacy of the class
representatives and resolve them, perhaps without specifically pointed
argument, in a favorable manner." 8 9
United States, 533 F.2d 1167, 1186-87 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1976), aff'd on other grounds, 431
U.S. 864 (1977); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 256-57 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975). See also Dam, supra note 8, at 111-12.
In Hansberry, the Supreme Court refused to hold the defendant bound by a stipulated
judgment entered in a prior suit in which the defendant was an absentee class member.
The Court held that where the interests of the absentee are not adequately represented,
res judicata will not apply in a subsequent suit, and found that the defendant's interests
had not been represented adequately. 311 U.S. at 44-45.
The courts which claim that Hansberry requires only adequate representation point to
the following language: "Mhis Court is justified in saying that there has been a failure of
due process only in those cases where it cannot be said that the procedure adopted, fairly
insures the protection of the interests of absent parties who are to be bound by it." E.g.,
Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d at 257 (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. at
42). However, this language should be read in light of the following: "We decide only that
the procedure and the course of litigation sustained here by the plea of resjudicata do not
satisfy [the requirements of due process]." 311 U.S. at 44. The latter excerpt suggests that
Hansberry did not set forth the standard for due process in representative suits, but rather
a minimum standard. Therefore, notice may be an additional requirement of due process
of law.
Another problem with using Hansberry to justify the absence of a notice requirement is
that Hansberry predated Mullane by ten years. Therefore, if Hansberry does stand for the
proposition that due process does not require notice, Mullane would seem to have
overruled Hansberry, sub silentio. But see Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d at
257 ("We do not believe that Mullane overruled sub silentio the case of Hansberry v. Lee
.... "). At least one court has suggested that Hansberry only sets forth a minimum
requirement, and that notice is necessary to ensure that one is adequately represented.
Lewis v. Philip Morris, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 345, 352 (E.D. Va. 1976).
85. 339 U.S. at 319.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 319-20.
88. Lewis v. Philip Morris, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. Va. 1976).
89. Id. at 352.
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A second problem with using adequacy of representation as a justifica-
tion for not requiring notice in (b)(2) actions is that Mullane suggests that
the absent class member is entitled to more than just adequate representa-
tion, and that notice serves to protect those entitlements. The Mullane
Court states that notice to the absentee serves to protect his or her
opportunity to "choose for himself whether to appear or default, ac-
quiesce or contest."9 This language has been construed by other courts
91
to guarantee the opportunity of absentees "to assess, for themselves, the
adequacy of their purported representatives. "92
The Mullane Court's language also suggests other rights of absentees:
pursuing one's own arguments, employing a particular strategy, choos-
ing the attorney one thinks will best represent him or her, and controlling
the overall shape and vigor one wishes to apply to the litigation. 93 These
rights are meaningless without notification to absent class members that a
suit is pending which would give rise to these rights.94 The rights of
absentee class members, as recognized by the Supreme Court, are rights
of which the Elliott and Souza class members may have been deprived
by the Ninth Circuit's refusal to require notice in 23(b)(2) actions. This
deprivation, in conjunction with the res judicata bar of any subsequent
claims of absentees, may well be a violation of the absentee class
members' rights to due process of law as defined by Mullane.
95
90. 339 U.S. at 314. "Quite different from the question of a state's power to discharge
trustees is that of the opportunity it must give beneficiaries to contest." Id. at 313
(emphasis added). It was recognized that "[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement
of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. "Id. at 314 (empha-
sis added).
91. E.g., Lewis v. Philip Morris, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. Va. 1976).
92. Id. at 352.
93. Note, Collateral Estoppel of Nonparties, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1496 (1974). See
Walker v. Styrex Indus., 21 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 355, 358 (M.D.N.C. 1976) ("These men and
women deserve the right to know that a suit is underway, to choose to withdraw from it if
they wish so to do, or to be represented by counsel of their own choosing."), quoted with
approval in Bauman v. United States Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 659 n.13 (9th Cir. 1977);
3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 24.09-1[4], at 316 (2d ed. 1977) ("[I]t can be argued that
the applicant should be the best judge of the adequacy of the representation of his own
interests."); Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1318, 1414
(1976) ("[E]ach individual is the best judge of his own interests, even on matters such as
the litigation strategy to be employed in the suit.").
94. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. at 314 ("[T]his right has
little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending . . ").
95. It should be noted that the refusal to require notice would probably not give rise to a
due process violation if class action judgments did not bar the subsequent claims of the
absentees. It is the res judicata effect of the judgment that gives rise to the Mullane
Court's concern for the protection of the interests of the absentee. Id.
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IV. TYPE OF NOTICE REQUIRED
The purposes of the class action device are to provide a vehicle for
redressing numerous small claims that would otherwise go unasserted
and to achieve the broad res judicata effect of a class action judgment. 96
If these claims are disposed of before reaching their merits, due to the
cost of individual notice, the purpose of the class action device will be
defeated. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,97 for example, the class
representatives were ordered to provide individual notice to over
2,250,000 23(b)(3) class members at a cost which would have exceeded
$315,000.9 This prohibitive cost prevented Mr. Eisen's $70.00 claim
from every reaching a trial on the merits. 99 Results of this kind have
caused class representatives to assert that their actions should qualify
under 23(b)(2) rather than 23(b)(3). 100 Differences in notice provisions
may have caused courts to certify actions as maintainable under (b)(2)
when those actions were probably more appropriately (b)(3) actions.101
Alternatives to costly individual notice may, however, be quite accept-
able under the terms of Mullane. Subsection 23(c)(2) requires that the
members of a (b)(3) class be given "the best notice practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be
identified through reasonable effort." 10 2 As noted previously, 10 3 this
96. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 560 (2d Cir. 1968).
97. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
98. Id. at 166-67 & n.7.
99. Dam, supra note 8, at 101.
100. See notes 53-55 supra and accompanying text.
101. In Eisen, the Second Circuit found the class to be of the (b)(3) type. 391 F.2d at
565. The Supreme Court affirmed this determination. 417 U.S. at 163-64. The Eisen
complaint contained three counts. Two of the counts were against odd-lot firms alleging
violations of the Sherman Act. The third count was against the New York Stock Exchange
alleging failure to regulate the odd-lot firms, a violation of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. Id. at 160. The Eisen plaintiffs sought injunction of defendants from future viola-
tions as well as damages. The damage claims against the NYSE were unspecified as to
their amounts. The damage claims against the odd-lot firms were in the amount of treble
damages on 1212 to 254 per share traded. Although this amount could have been a
substantial loss to the defendant, it would not have yielded a substantial gain to the class
members. Id. at 160-61.
In Elliott, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the Secretary from recouping overpayments
without providing notice and a preceding hearing. 564 F.2d at 1228. The complaint also
prayed for damages in the amount of the recouped overpayments. Id. The plaintiffs'
claims were quite substantial. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
Using the Eisen facts to illustrate the posture of a proper (b)(3) action, it would seem
that Elliott should have been maintained under (b)(3) rather than (b)(2). The classes
appear to have been equally cohesive. Furthermore, both classes sought damages and
injunctive relief, and in Elliott the damages were considerably greater than in Eisen.
102. FED. R. Cv. P. 23(c)(2); see note 15 supra.
103. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
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subdivision is limited in its application to (b)(3) actions. Therefore, the
type of notice required in (b)(2) actions depends upon what due process
requires in a given situation. It is-doubtful that Mullane establishes as
inflexible an approach as 23(c)(2).1° Mullane ordered individual notice
to all beneficiaries whose names and addresses were "at hand." 105 The
Court found notice by publication to be sufficient as to those be-
neficiaries whose interests or addresses were unknown to the trustee. 1
06
In arriving at its decision, the Mullane Court adopted a balancing
approach whereby the interests of the state in settling issues as to its
fiduciaries were weighed against the interests of absentees in being
apprised of the action:1
°7
The Court has not committed itself to any formula achieving a
balance between these interests in a particular proceeding or deter-
mining when constructive notice may be utilized or what test it must
meet. Personal service has not in all circumstances been regarded as
indispensable to the process due residents, and it has more often
been held unnecessary as to nonresidents. We disturb none of the
established rules on these subjects. 08
The Mullane Court also noted that the Supreme Court "has not
hesitated to approve of resort to publication as a customary substitute in
another class of cases where it is not reasonably possible or practicable to
give more adequate warning."1°9 Under Mullane, "practical difficulties
and costs" may be considered in determining whether individual notice
is required by due process in a given situation. 1
10
It would follow that in the case of (b)(2) actions where individual
damages are de minimus or where the cost of individual notice would
generally not be justified in light of the particular circumstances, the
interests of the state in providing a remedy and in ensuring a binding
judgment through the class action device would outweigh the need for
individual notice, and notice by publication would be sufficient."' In
104. Branham v. General Elec. Co., 63 F.R.D. 667, 670-71 (M.D. Tenn. 1974);
Comment, Consumer Class Actions in California: A Practical Approach to the Problems
of Notice, 7 PAC. L.J. 811, 821-22 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as Consumer Class
Actions].
105. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. at 318.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 313-14.
108. Id. at 314.
109. Id. at 317. The other "class of cases" referred to by the Mullane Court were those
involving "persons missing or unknown." See, e.g., Cunnius v. Reading School Dist., 198
U.S. 458, 476-77 (1905).
110. 339 U.S. at 317.
111. Consumer Class Actions, supra note 104, at 821-22.
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Elliott and Souza, however, individual notice should have been re-
quired; the potential class claims were substantial in amount1 2 and
individual notice in either case would not have imposed a significant
burden. Mullane gave considerable weight to the fact that correspon-
dence had occurred between a party to the suit and the absentees,113 a
factor presumably existing in both Eliott and Souza. In either case,
notification of the pending suits could have been included with other
communications between the defendants and the absentee class members
imposing little in the way of cost or burden.
V. CONCLUSION
One interpretation of the Elliott and Souza opinions is that they
represent an effort on the part of the Ninth Circuit to preserve the utility
of the 23(b)(2) class action device as a means of enforcing individual
rights. This utility may be defeated by a requirement that costly notice be
provided to absentees. On the other hand, failure to impose such a
requirement poses a substantial risk to the due process rights of the
absentees. There is an unresolved conflict between the individual's
interest in litigating claims and the individual's right to due process of
law.
The Ninth Circuit notice requirement in (b)(2) class actions must be
examined against the standards for individual due process rights as
expressed by the Supreme Court in the Mullane decision. This examina-
tion may suggest that the Ninth Circuit view is inconsistent with the
Court's concerns in Mullane. Furthermore, since it is clear that alterna-
tives to costly individual notice may satisfy the due process requirement
in many (b)(2) actions without inhibiting the utility of the class action
device, no great hardship would result should (b)(2) actions be required
to provide the kinds of notice envisioned in Mullane. Care must be taken
to preserve those interests which the Supreme Court has viewed as
fundamental to our system of justice.
Gregg S. Homer
112. See text accompanying notes 31-37 supra.
113. 339 U.S. at 318-19. "The trustee periodically remits [the beneficiaries'] income to
them, and we think that they might reasonably expect that with or apart from their
remittances word might come to them personally that steps were being taken affecting
their interests." Id. at 318. "[T]he fact that the trust company has been able to give mailed
notice to known beneficiaries at the time the common trust fund was established is
persuasive that postal notification at the time of accounting would not seriously burden
the plan." Id. at 319.
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